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1 Introduction
In most countries, students are promoted from one grade to the next on the basis of
their academic performance. The PISA 2009 Report shows considerable variation in
grade retention rates across OECD countries, with the grade retention rate dened as
the percentage of 15- year-old pupils who are not in their countrys reference grade.
The report shows that the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal have relatively high
rates of grade retention (with up to 50% of pupils having repeated one year or more)
whereas countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Japan, Norway and the UK have no
grade retention at all (see Belot and Vandenberghe, 2011). Spain belongs to the rst
group, with about 40% grade retention on average. These disparities may be due
to di¤erences in policies, with some countries allowing students to be promoted to
higher grades regardless of their performance and others conditioning promotion on
studentseducational achievements.
The recent interest in academic performance di¤erences across countries as a re-
sult of increased international competition has brought the retention policy to the
forefront of the educational debate. The PISA 2009 Report shows important di¤er-
ences in this dimension. In particular, countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, France
and Greece are clearly below average among the OECD countries and did not show
any improvement with respect to the 2000, 2003 and 2006 reports.1Moreover, even
within a single country, scores vary widely across regions. For example, in Spain, the
average math score in southern regions (e.g., the Canary Islands and Andalusia) is
between 61 and 34 points below the OECD average whereas the average math score
in some northern regions (e.g., Castile Leon or Navarre) is about 18 points above
the OECD average. However, studentspoor performance on international tests is
not the only concern of policy makers and academics. Increasing drop-out rates (see
OECD, 2009) are also a major worry.2 Among a number of policies devised to help
reduce school dropout rates and improve academic performance, we focus on grade
retention regulation in this paper.
Our objective is to estimate the grade retention e¤ect on educational outcomes for
the whole Spanish sample and for each of the Spanish regions with enlarged sample.
There is a great deal of controversy regarding the practice of grade retention. The
proponents of retention argue that it may reinforce a students knowledge, with po-
1The average PISA 2009 test scores of Spanish students in math, reading and science are 480,
484 and 488, respectively, which are 13, 12 and 13 points below the respective OECD means and,
obviously, much smaller than the scores in the best-performing countries, the Republic of Korea and
Finland, where students score above 530 points in all disciplines
2See Dearden et al. (2006) for an analysis of policies aimed at reducing drop-out rates in the
UK.
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tential benets for his or her subsequent outcomes. Additional exposure to teaching,
especially in early grades, may make a student more likely to pursue higher levels of
education. Indeed, repetition may also improve the quality of the match between the
school and the student if his development makes him more apt to succeed in a certain
grade at a later age. The main argument in favor of grade retention is that it provides
incentives to increase e¤ort, making it an e¢ cient mechanism to reallocate students.
However, this e¢ ciency may come at a cost because retained students take longer to
pass through the educational system. The critics of retention argue that it does not
lead to improvements in school achievement and, instead, harms those low-achieving
students who are most at risk of failure. They base their opinion on a large body of
research on education and pedagogy that documents the negative e¤ects of retention,
particularly in terms of reducing the high school completion rate.3
The challenge in identifying the e¤ect of grade failure on subsequent school out-
comes lies in the fact that latent school outcomes (i.e., those that would be observed
in the absence of grade failure) and the propensity to repeat a grade are likely to
be determined simultaneously. Characteristics of the student (ability or motivation),
the socioeconomic background and the school are likely to a¤ect grade retention and
attainment simultaneously. Such correlations will likely overestimate the impact of
grade failure on subsequent outcomes and compromise the identication of a causal
e¤ect of retention on scores. In addition, note that most tests that evaluate students
knowledge in some particular discipline may not be appropriate for studying grade
retention. Because repeaters are enrolled in lower grades, they have completed a less
advanced curriculum and thus have a lower expected score.
A growing body of literature examines the relationship between grade retention
and educational outcomes. Some studies provide quasi-experimental evidence of the
e¤ects of grade retention. For example, Manacorda (2008) exploits a discontinuity
induced by a rule establishing automatic grade retention for pupils missing more than
25 days of school during a single academic year and shows that grade retention leads
to a substantial increase in the drop-out rate and lower educational attainment 4 or 5
years later. Jacob and Lefgren (2004) nd no consistent di¤erences in the performance
of retained versus promoted students in the short run. However, Jacob and Lefgren
(2009), who study the long-run e¤ects of retention on high school completion, nd
positive e¤ects of grade retention on education attainment for low-achieving third
3Some studies have found that retention is associated with increased drop-out rates (see Jimerson
et al. (2002) and Roderick (1994), among others). However, as retention decisions are typically made
by the teacher or school principal on the basis of a number of unobservable student characteristics
(such as maturity or parental involvement), all of these studies are plagued by serious selection
concerns.
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graders but no signicant e¤ect for sixth graders. They use a regression discontinuity
design strategy based on promotional decisions tied to performance on standardized
tests in the Chicago public schools.
Because PISA exams are aimed not at evaluating studentscurricular knowledge
but at assessing their general abilities, the score on this test is a more appropriate
measure of the impact of grade retention on educational attainment. To circumvent
the identication problem noted above, we suggest using a switching regression ap-
proach.4 Our main identication strategy is based on the fact that some variables
may a¤ect studentsoutcome only through their e¤ect on the probability of repeat-
ing a grade. In this sense, we use the students quarter of birth as an instrumental
variable. We argue that this variable a¤ects the probability of grade retention but
does not directly a¤ect educational outcomes.
Several important results are found. First, if we consider grade retention as ex-
ogenous to the individual unobserved heterogeneity, the e¤ect of grade repetition on
Spanish studentsPISA outcomes is about 80 points out of an average math score of
480. If we take into account the two di¤erent educational processes for repeater and
non-repeater students, this gure does not change much. However, once endogeneity
is properly controlled for, the retention e¤ect is reduced considerably for repeaters.
With our model, we are able to measure the predicted e¤ect of grade retention on
those who are actually retained: retention reduces their score by about 56 points.
However, if we calculate the potential e¤ect of grade retention on non-retained stu-
dents, the estimated e¤ect is above 125 points. That is, had they been retained as
repeaters, their PISA outcomes would have been reduced by more than twice the
observed reduction for repeaters.
Estimation of di¤erent types of repetition e¤ects at the primary and secondary
levels yields some interesting ndings. Those students who were held back during their
primary education su¤ered a larger impact on their educational outcomes compared
with those who were retained during secondary school. In contrast, for non-repeaters,
repeating a grade of secondary school is estimated to have a larger e¤ect. Moreover,
we observed that repeating a grade in both primary and secondary school has a much
larger negative e¤ect compared with repeating only one grade in either primary or
secondary school.
We nd that grade retention varies substantially across regions: the retention
e¤ect among repeaters is larger in some northern regions (e.g., Castile Leon and
Rioja), which have the best educational outcomes, and is much smaller in Baleares
(-38.5 points) and Canarias (-46.8).
4Many studies use this type of model to analyze di¤erent aspects of the labor market. See, among
others, García-Pérez and Jimeno (2007), Carrasco (2001) and Prescott and Wilton (1992).
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Finally, we decompose the observed di¤erence between repeatersand non-repeaters
scores into three di¤erent components: observed di¤erences in characteristics, di¤er-
ences in the predicted e¤ects of each of these observable characteristics (returns) and
di¤erences due to endogenous selection. We nd that the observed di¤erences among
repeaters and non-repeaters in Spain are essentially explained by di¤erent returns
to observed individual, socioeconomic, and school characteristics that explain educa-
tional outcomes. This component accounts for 89% of the total di¤erence whereas
the component due to di¤erences in observed characteristics accounts for only 25%.
What is more interesting is that endogenous selection makes observed di¤erences ap-
pear 15% smaller than they actually are once we control for self-selection into the
groups of repeaters and non-repeaters. Thus, without accounting for such endogene-
ity in the retaining status, di¤erences between repeaters and non-repeaters would
be overestimated. Interestingly, this bias is most important in Catalonia and the
Basque Country, the two regions where the percentage of retained students is the
lowest among all Spanish regions. Hence, these regions seem to be implementing a
slightly di¤erent retention policy, although this policy is not reducing the di¤erences
between repeaters and non-repeaters. On the contrary, the smaller observed di¤er-
ences in these two regions are due largely to increased larger self-selection into the
two student groups. Our nal result clearly demonstrates the importance of grade
retention and the possibility that it is depressing the Spanish average. We perform a
counterfactual exercise that shows that the Spanish average score would increase by
about 25 points if grade retention were not considered.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Spanish
education system and presents a descriptive analysis based on our PISA 2009 data.
Section 3 explains our methodology and identication strategy. Section 4 presents
the results, and nally, Section 5 presents some important concluding comments.
2 Background and Data
We rst briey describe the Spanish education system. The school system is orga-
nized into three cycles: primary (grades 1-6), secondary (grades 7-10) and pre-college
(grades 11-12). The rst two cycles are compulsory (a student can choose to leave
school at age 16). In 2009, the reference academic year in our study, the grade re-
tention policy was as follows. At the primary and secondary levels, students could
repeat a grade if their performance was deemed insu¢ cient. More specically, stu-
dents were required to repeat a grade if they failed three or more subjects. Students
can only repeat a grade once during their primary education. In secondary school,
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they can only repeat the same grade once, and they can only repeat grades twice in
total.5 Rules on grade retention are the same in every region in Spain, and as can be
observed in Table 1, retention practices are similar throughout all Spanish regions.
In this paper, we use the PISA 2009 sample for Spain, and in particular the data
for the regions with enlarged samples.6 The PISA 2009 database provides individual-
level information on demographics (e.g., gender, immigration status, month of birth),
socioeconomic background (parental education), school-level variables and achieve-
ment test scores. We use math test score as our dependent variable here, as it shows
the most variation between retained and non-retained students.7
Every student in the sample was born in 1993 (i.e., they were 15 years old when
they took the PISA exams). In Spain, all students born in the same calendar year
must enter school in the same academic year, with the 10th grade being the reference
grade for 15-year-old students. Thus, we will call "non-repeater" students those
enrolled in grade 10 and "repeater" students those enrolled in lower grades (8th
or 9th).8 The total Spanish sample comprises 25,887 students, of whom 8,209 are
repeaters. Regional sample sizes are similar to each other, at approximately 1,500
students per region, with the exception of Basque Country, which includes data from
almost 5,000 students.9
Table 1 presents summary statistics for "non-repeater" students (columns 3 and
4) and "repeater" students (columns 5 and 6). We observe that the Canary Islands
and Andalusia have the highest percentages of repeaters, at 45.5% and 42.9%, respec-
tively. In addition, the same two regions present the lowest mean test scores for both
repeaters and non-repeaters.10 However, the best-performing regions, Castile Leon
5The prevailing educational law in 2009 was the 2006 Organic Educational Law
(LOE). For more statistics and details on the Spanish educational system, visit
http://www.educacion.gob.es/ievaluacion/publicaciones/indicadores-educativos/Sistema-
Estatal.html.
6The regions with a representative sample are Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands,
Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile Leon, Catalonia, Galicia, La Rioja, Murcia, Madrid, Navarre,
Basque Country and Ceuta-Melilla. We refer to the three regions for which no representative sample
is available (Extremadura, Castilla-Mancha and Valencia) as "the rest of Spain".
7The PISA program assesses studentsperformance in three disciplines: science, math and read-
ing. PISA 2009 edition focused on reading. Following the OECDs recommended methodology, we
use the 5 plausible values and 80 sampling weights in the PISA Technical Report to calculate each
students educational outcome and the standard errors of the estimated coe¢ cients.
8This denition is based on questions 1 and 3 of the PISA Student Questionnaire.
9The PISA sample has a stratied two-stage design. First, schools with 15-year-old students are
selected, and second, within each school, individual students are selected. See PISA 2009 Technical
Report (2011).
10Ceuta and Melilla, which participate jointly in PISA, are the cities with the poorest performance
(e.g., their average math score is 417). However, because they have small relative dimensions within
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and Aragon, do not have the lowest percentage of repeaters (we analyze this result
in more detail below).
Regarding individual variables, we observe that the proportion of repeaters is
higher among males than among females (41.1% and 31.9%, respectively). Neverthe-
less, females achieve lower test scores than males do. In addition, the proportion of
repeaters is larger among younger students (those born in the 3rd and 4th quarters
of 1993). The proportion of repeaters is higher among immigrants compared with
native students. Finally, the percentage of repeaters increases with the frequency
of PC game use and with decreasing computer use. The socioeconomic variables
have the expected relation with grade retention. That is, the number of repeaters is
higher among students with low-educated parents.11 We can also observe that the
proportion of repeaters decreases with the number of books at home. In addition,
the percentage of repeaters is higher among those students whose parents (especially
the mother) do not live at home. Finally, regarding the school-level variables, we nd
that the number of repeaters is higher in schools with more than 50% female students
compared with other schools. School type (ownership) also a¤ects the proportion of
repeaters: whereas only 19.5% and 25.6% of students in private schools repeat a grade
(in independent and government-dependent schools, respectively), 43.6% of students
in public schools do so.12 We also consider parentspressure on the school and dif-
ferentiate between schools with a majority of parents demanding very high academic
standards and schools with only a minority of parents doing so (or no parents at all).
We observe here that the proportion of repeaters is lower in schools where parents
exert signicant pressure. Class size is also crucial for grade retention. This vari-
able is categorized into two groups based on the median class size of 21 students.
Interestingly, the percentage of repeaters is larger in those schools with smaller class
size.13
Table 2 shows the distributions of the explanatory variables across regions. With
respect to individual-level variables, we observe some di¤erences regarding the per-
Spain, we considered them in our econometric analysis but we do not comment on them when
reporting some of our results
11A fathers education is "high" if he has a secondary or higher education degree and "low" if he
has a primary or lower education degree. The same categories hold for motherseducation.
12Regarding school ownership, we distinguish between public, government-dependent private (i.e.,
those with a percentage of public funding above 50%) and independent private (i.e., those with a
percentage of public funding less than or equal to 50%).
13There is no clear empirical evidence on the impact of class size. Angrist and Lavy (1999)
nd that reducing class size induces a signicant and substantial increase in test scores. However,
Hanushek (1998) nds no signicant impact of class size reduction on scores. Lazear (2001) argues
that the reason why there is no consensus in the literature is because class size is a choice variable:
schools adapt class size to studentstype and behavior.
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centages of immigrants: whereas in Madrid and Baleares more than 15% of students
are immigrants, fewer than 6% are immigrants in Andalusia and Galicia. Students
from Catalonia use computers more often than students in any other region. How-
ever, regional di¤erences in socioeconomic variables are larger. For example, there is
a 22.3-percentage-point gap between Madrid, the region with the highest percentage
of highly educated mothers, and Andalusia, the region with the lowest percentage.
The same gap in fathers education is 21 percentage points. The region with the
fewest students whose parents are highly educated is Andalusia, at only 44.7%. The
region with the most parents who are highly educated is Cantabria, at 64%. As we
can see in this table, Andalusia has the lowest percentage of students belonging to a
household with more than 200 books at home, at only 17.9%, whereas this percentage
is 33% in Madrid. The Canary Islands have the highest percentage of students whose
mother or father does not live at home (4% and 15.2%, respectively).
Finally, we also observe important di¤erences in the distributions of school-level
variables across regions. For example, Spanish regions di¤er greatly in the percentages
of students attending each type of school. The regions with the highest percentages of
students in public schools are Canarias and Murcia (between 75% and 80%), whereas
in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Madrid this rate is much lower (between 42%
and 60%). However, the Basque Country and Catalonia di¤er signicantly in the
percentages of students attending private schools: whereas, in the Basque Country,
58% of students attend government-dependent private schools, this percentage in
Catalonia is only 21%. The regions with the highest percentage of parents exerting
pressure are Catalonia and Madrid (84.5% and 55%, respectively). Finally, Murcia
has the largest class size: 66% of students attend classes with 21 students or more.
In Asturias, only 30.2% of students attend such large classes.
2.1 Grade retention and scores
In this section, we provide some primary analysis on the relationship between grade
retention and PISA test scores. Table 3 shows the mean and several percentiles
of the distributions of PISA scores for non-repeater and repeater students. The
observed average di¤erence between the two groups is impressive: more than 100
points, not only at the mean level, but also at the three percentiles shown. We
distinguish three subgroups within repeater students depending on when they re-
peated (primary and/or secondary school). Table 3 also displays the means and
percentiles for these three types of repeaters: those students who repeated only in
primary school (Repeaters_P), those who repeated in both primary and secondary
school (Repeaters_PS) and those who repeated only at the secondary level (Re-
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peaters_S).14 As Table 3 indicates, the worst performers are those who repeated a
grade at both educational levels.
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Figure 1: Math score histogram by grade retention in subgroups of repeaters
Figure 1 displays the histogram of PISA 2009 math scores for each group of stu-
dents. There is heterogeneity within the complete distribution of scores for both
repeaters and non-repeaters. However, what is really interesting is that the distrib-
ution of PISA scores for repeaters overlaps that of non-repeaters. Hence, there are
repeater students in our sample who score better than some non-repeaters, most likely
because of the e¤ects of observed or unobserved determinants of their performance.
Finally, the distributions of scores for repeaters only at the primary or secondary level
seem to be more spread out than the distribution of scores for repeaters at both the
primary and secondary levels.
Figure 2 below o¤ers some more evidence about the relationship between grade
retention and math score. In this case, we aggregate data at the regional level and
14This denition is based on question 7 of the PISA Student Questionnaire. Note that there is a
slight di¤erence between the number of repeaters according to the general denition above (that is,
based on questions 1 and 3 of the PISA Student Questionnaire) and the total number of repeaters
obtained by adding Repeaters_ P, Repeaters_ PS and Repeaters_ S. We assume this di¤erence to
be due to measurement error.
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compare the percentages of repeaters and their average math scores. We see a negative
relationship between these two variables, which is consistent with the descriptive
statistics above. The negative slope in panel (a) shows that, in general, those regions
with better performance also have fewer repeaters. However, this relationship is not
deterministic (e.g., Catalonia has a lower average math score and a lower percentage
of repeaters than Castile and Leon). In panels (b), (c) and (d), the percentages of
repeaters in the three subgroups are plotted. The negative relationship between scores
and percentages of repeaters remains, in particular for those students who repeated
a grade only at the secondary level.15
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Figure 2: Relation between percentage of repeaters and average math score across
Spanish regions
15Notice that the percentage of repeaters is the sum of the percentages of repeaters in each
subgroup (primary only, primary and secondary, secondary only). Thus, the slope in panel (a) is
the sum of the slopes in (b), (c) and (d).
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3 Methodology
3.1 The empirical model
In this paper, we study the e¤ect of grade retention on test scores. Prior studies have
attempted to study this e¤ect by estimating the following basic model:
yi = Ii +  X i + ui + "i; (1)
where yi is student achievement, X i is a vector of individual, socioeconomic and
school variables and Ii is a binary variable that takes the value one if the student is
retained and zero otherwise; ui represents unobserved student ability and "i is the
error term. Several comments can be made here.
First observe that general tests that evaluate studentsknowledge in some partic-
ular discipline may not be appropriate for studying grade retention. As repeaters are
enrolled in lower grades, they have completed a less advanced curriculum and thus
have a lower expected score. In this sense, we believe that the PISA test is a proper
one, as it does not aim to evaluate studentscurricular knowledge but their general
abilities.16
Second, note that if students are selected into retention on the basis of factors that
are unobservable and that inuence educational outcomes (e.g., parental e¤ort or a
course-specic curriculum), then the estimation of  is likely to be biased. Observe
that being a repeater is due to low scores in previous years. Hence, di¤erences between
repeaters and non-repeaters are not only due to grade retention. Indeed, repeaters
may have di¤erent characteristics that inuence their own educational attainment.
More specically, our initial hypothesis is that students who do not pass are those
with the worst learning characteristics. To the extent that these characteristics are
unobservable, estimated di¤erences in educational outcome between repeaters and
non-repeaters may be biased under OLS.
The typical approach to dealing with this endogeneity problem is using instru-
mental variables techniques. Note that this approach implies imposing equal e¤ects
on the rest of the regressors in the educational outcome equations (see Equations (4)
and (5) below) for both repeaters and non-repeaters. However, we believe that there
must be other di¤erences between these two groups besides a change in the levels
16PISA assesses the extent to which students near the end of their compulsory education have
acquired some of the knowledge and skills that are essential for full participation in modern societies.
PISA seeks not only to assess whether students can reproduce knowledge but also to examine how
well they can extrapolate from what they have learned and apply it in unfamiliar settings both in
and outside of school (see PISA 2009 Report).
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of such outcomes. To address this issue, we propose to estimate a switching regres-
sion model (SRM) to allow unbiased estimation of the model coe¢ cients, controlling
for endogenous selection of repeaters and non-repeaters, and to allow for potentially
di¤erent e¤ects of the variables included in the model for each group. As usual, we
estimate this model by maximum likelihood.17
We specify the probability of repeating as a function of student characteristics.
This probability acts as the selection equation in the Switching Regression model
for repeatersand non-repeatersscores. In this model, the selection mechanism is
described through a latent variable denoted by Ii , with the following process:
Ii = Zi + ei; (2)
where Zi is a vector of specic explanatory variables that describes the determinants
of the selection process,  is the corresponding vector of unknown parameters, and
ei is the random component of the selection equation, which includes unobservable
variables that could be correlated with the observable and unobservable character-
istics in the educational outcomes equations below. However, we only observe the
realization of this latent variable I

i as follows:
Ii =
(
1 iff Ii > 0
0 iff Ii  0;
(3)
that is, Ii is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the student repeats and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, as explained above, we will consider a di¤erent equation for each group
of students: repeaters, yRi and non-repeaters yNRi:
yRi = XiR + uRi; (4)
yNRi = XiNR + uNRi: (5)
We will refer to the previous two equations as the educational outcomes equations.
We allow for endogeneity in the selection equation by assuming that ei, uRi and
uNRi have a normal trivariate distribution with mean zero and a covariance matrix
as follows:

 =
264 2R2R;NR 2NR
2e;R 
2
e;NR 
2
e
375 ; (6)
17As the error term of each students score equation is correlated with the error term of the selection
equation, the estimation of the wage equations by OLS would be inconsistent. Furthermore, full
maximum likelihood is more e¢ cient than the two-step estimation method proposed by Heckman
(1979).
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where 2e denotes the variance of the error term in the selection equation (2) and 
2
R
and 2NR are the variances of the error terms in the education outcome equations (4)
and (5), respectively. Finally, we denote by 2e;R and 
2
e;NR the covariances between
uRi and ei and between uNRi and ei, respectively. These terms capture the correlation
between the probability of grade retention and the educational attainment of repeaters
and non-repeaters, respectively. The interpretation of these terms is as follows. If, for
example, 2eR < 0, then there exists a negative relationship between the unobserved
variables that make a student more likely to repeat and the unobserved characteristics
that increase a repeating students test score. That is, those factors that make a
student more likely to fail also make a repeater earn a worse test. On the contrary, if
2e;R > 0, then what makes a student more likely to repeat also make a repeater have
a better educational result.18 Finally, if 2e;R = 0, then there is no correlation between
the errors of the selection equation and the educational attainment of repeaters. The
interpretation of 2e;NR is similar.
We denote by j for j = R;NR the correlation coe¢ cient between ei and uRi for
j = R or uNRi for j = NR. These two coe¢ cients are jointly estimated with the rest
of the parameters in the model, and their interpretation is analogous to that of 2e;R
and 2e;NR. Hence, given the assumption about the distribution of error terms, the
log-likelihood function of the equations system (4) and (5) to maximize is:
lnL =
X
i
Ii
 
ln((
(Zi + RuRi=R)p
1  2R
) + ln((uRi=R)=R)
!
+ (1  Ii)
 
ln(1  ((Zi + NRuNRi=NR)p
1  2NR
) + ln((uNRi=NR)=NR)
!
;(7)
where () is the cumulative distribution function of the selection process conditional
on educational scores, and () is the density function of educational scores.
Now observe that we can obtain unconditional and conditional educational score
predictions. The unconditional educational score is dened as the average predicted
score for students with average unobserved characteristics, 1 and 0 for repeaters
and non-repeaters, respectively. That is:
1 = X
1R; (8)
0 = X
0NR; (9)
18For example, if the experience of repeating makes the students subsequent e¤ort increase, we
may observe a higher PISA score among repeaters compared with the counterfactual of what would
have happened had the student not repeated.
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where X1 and X0 denote the average observed characteristics for repeater and non-
repeater students, respectively. The conditional score, y1R and y
0
NR; represents the
mean predicted score for each student type, that is, from Equations (2) to (9):
y1R = E (yR j I = 1) = E

yR j I
  0

= 1 + e;R
 (z)
 (z)
; (10)
y0NR = E (yNR j I = 0) = E

yNR j I

< 0

= 0   e:NR
 (z)
1   (z) ; (11)
We will use these two expressions when trying to breakdown the educational gap
between repeater and non-repeater students. Using Equations (8) to (11), we can de-
compose the educational gap between repeater and non-repeater students as follows:
y0NR   y1R = ( X0   X1)NR+ (NR   R) X1  [e;NR (z)1 (z) + e;R (z)(z) ]: (12)
The rst term on the right-hand side in the equation above corresponds to the ob-
served di¤erences in characteristics, the second term measures di¤erences in the pre-
dicted e¤ect of each of these observable characteristics (returns) and the third term
corresponds to di¤erences due to endogenous selection. In Section 4.2 below, we
estimate each of these components.
In addition, we may compute the following conditional scores:
y0R = E (yR j I = 0) = E

yR j I

< 0

= X0R   e:R
 (z)
1   (z) ; (13)
y1NR = E (yNR j I = 1) = E

yNR j I
  0

= X1NR + e:NR
 (z)
 (z)
: (14)
These counterfactuals allow us to compute the grade retention e¤ect for repeaters,
GRE1, and for non-repeaters, GRE0, as follows:
GRE1 = y1R   y1NR (15)
GRE0 = y0R   y0NR (16)
In Section 4, we estimate the grade retention e¤ect as measured by the previous
expressions to understand the e¤ects of self-selection into repeaters and non-repeaters.
3.2 Identication
Our model will be identied once we allow for di¤erent regressors in each equation
of the switching model (see Maddala (1988)). The identication is also possible due
to the assumptions about the joint normal distribution of the three error terms (uNi,
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uNRi and ei). Nonetheless, we also identify the model by considering instrumental
variables. The assumption now is that these instruments have an impact on the
propensity of grade retention, but they do not directly a¤ect a students PISA score.
Hence, our specication will allow identication of the model by introducing variables
in the selection equation (2) that are signicant for explaining the probability of
repeating but are mostly uncorrelated with the students scores (Equations (4) and
(5)).
Following the existing literature, we choose studentsquarter of birth as an instru-
ment. The quarter of birth is generally assumed to have an impact on pre-primary and
primary test scores and thus on grade retention. Bedard and Dhuey (2006), among
others, show that the relative age of a child in his class does not have a signicant
long-term impact, but most of the e¤ect of relative age comes from programs such
as grade retention and selection of pupils into di¤erent grades. Indeed, during the
very rst days of school, relative age is quite important because the oldest students
may be much more mature than the youngest ones. As relative maturity is likely to
be an important determinant of achievement during the early grades, it may play a
crucial role in the decision of grade retention. The remainder of this section is aimed
at showing data supporting this instrument. We base our argument on two kinds of
analyses. First, we show that unconditional analyses in Table 1 and Figure 3 below
give us some reason to choose this variable for the identication of the model. Second,
we report conditional analyses that clear up any doubts about the appropriateness of
our instrument.
As we can observe in Table 1, the average test score for non-repeater students
does not vary signicantly with the quarter of birth (it ranges from 518 for those
born in Q3 to 522 for those born in Q4). The same can be said for repeater students.
However, the probability of repeating varies greatly with the students quarter of
birth (ranging from 30% for those born in Q1 to 43% for those born in Q4). These
two results are required for an appropriate instrument.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) below show the average math score by quarter of birth, with
Figure 3(b) di¤erentiating between repeaters and non-repeaters. Figure 3(c) displays
the percentage of repeaters by quarter of birth. As can be observed in Figure 3(a), the
quarter of birth a¤ects math scores if we do not di¤erentiate according to retention
status. Those students who were born in the fourth quarter scored more than 10
points lower than students who were born in the rst quarter. However, once we
distinguish between repeaters and non-repeaters (see Figure 3(b)), the quarter of
birth shows almost no e¤ect on scores. Finally, as can be observed in Figure 3(c), the
quarter of birth has an important e¤ect on the propensity to repeat a grade.
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Figure 3: Instrument: Quarter of birth
To further check the robustness of our instrument, we perform an additional con-
ditional analysis. We estimate the impact of the instrumental variable on students
scores once we control for all explanatory variables in our empirical model, joint with
an indicator about whether the student is a repeater. Quarter of birth is introduced
by two dummy variables that allow us to estimate the e¤ect of being born in the third
and fourth quarters with respect to a reference student born in the rst or second
quarter. Coe¢ cient t-tests indicate that none of these dummies are signicant predic-
tors of PISA test scores once we consider in the same equation whether the student
is a repeater. The coe¢ cient and standard deviation are -2.02 and 2.19, respectively,
for students born in the 3rd quarter and 0.74 and 2.35, respectively, for students born
in the 4th quarter. Hence, we can conclude that quarter of birth can be used as an
instrument, enabling us to identify our structural model.
4 The results
In this section, we rst comment on the results regarding the explanatory variables
of the probability of grade retention. Second, we elaborate on the impact of grade
retention on PISA test scores, show the educational outcome equationsestimation
and decompose di¤erences between repeaters and non-repeaters.
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4.1 The probability of grade retention
In this section, we rst comment on the results regarding the explanatory variables
of the probability of grade retention. Second, we elaborate on the impact of grade
retention on PISA test scores, show the educational outcome equationsestimation
and decompose di¤erences between repeaters and non-repeaters.19 With respect to
the regional variables, the coe¢ cients of both models are very similar, although some
di¤erences emerge in, for example, the signicant e¤ect of regions such as Galicia,
Catalonia or Basque Country when compared with the Canary Islands in the SRM.
Regarding the individual variables, we nd that our instrumental variable pro-
posed above is a signicant predictor of the probability of repeating. Observe that
the probability of grade retention increases with the students quarter of birth. Most
socioeconomic and school variables in the selection equation are signicant. The prob-
ability of repeating is negatively related to being female, the frequency of computer
use for homework, parental education, the number of books at home and attending a
government-dependent private school. A high probability of repeating is also related
to being an immigrant, playing PC games very often, having a parent who does not
live at home or going to a school with a majority of girls. Regarding class size, we
nd that increasing class size has a positive impact on the probability of being pro-
moted, but this positive e¤ect diminishes with class size. In particular, we nd that
the optimum class size in terms of minimizing the probability of repeating is about 30
students. Above that gure, the probability of repeating increases. Finally, observe
that the coe¢ cients of the Probit and the SRM models are very similar. Moreover,
the negative impacts on the probability of repeating of the frequency of computer
use for homework and of attending a private government-dependent school, and the
positive e¤ect of being born in the 4th quarter, having a mother who does not live at
home or attending a school with a majority of girls become stronger once we control
for the endogeneity of grade retention. In contrast, being born in the 3rd quarter and
attending a private independent school become a bit less signicant.
4.2 The e¤ect of grade retention on scores
The main objective of our study is to estimate the e¤ect of grade retention on educa-
tional attainment. Our estimation strategy (SRM) allows us to estimate two di¤erent
19The reference student in both equations is a male from the Canary Islands, a native of Spain,
born in the rst or second quarter of the year, with low frequency of using a computer for homework
and games, whose mother and father are low educated and living at home, with fewer than 26
books at home. Regarding the school variables, the reference student attends a public school with
a minority of boys and low parental pressure.
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grade retention e¤ects: one for repeaters and another for non-repeaters. This model
takes into account that these two groups of students may have di¤erent unobserved
characteristics that may bias the estimation if they are not correctly controlled for. In
this model, we assume that the educational production functions for the two groups
of students di¤er.
In addition to the SRM, we estimate two models to compare the estimation of the
grade retention e¤ect when endogeneity of selection into repeaters and non-repeaters
is not considered: OLS(a) and OLS(b). The former consists of OLS estimation of
two di¤erent educational outcome equations, as in (4) and (5), but without con-
trolling for selection bias. The latter is an OLS estimation of just one educational
outcome equation, which is the same for both groups of students as in (1). Finally, we
have also estimated an IV model that controls for endogeneity based on the OLS(b)
specication.
Before focusing on grade retention e¤ects, we report the main results regarding the
explanatory variables in the models. Table 5 shows the e¤ects of individual, family
and school variables on educational outcomes according to SRM, OLS(a), OLS(b)
and IV. Our SRM results show that high educational achievement in math is found
among males, natives, those who frequently use a computer for homework, those
with highly educated parents, those with a large number of books at home and those
attending a school where a majority of the students are girls. We nd that class size
has a positive e¤ect on math scores, but with decreasing returns. Specically, we nd
that the optimum class size to maximize studentsmath scores is 25 students for non-
repeaters and 22 for repeaters. This nding is consistent with the existing literature
on class size (see footnote 12 above). We also nd some important di¤erences in the
impact of the explanatory variables on educational achievement between repeaters
and non-repeaters. For example, being an immigrant is much less favorable for non-
repeaters than for repeaters. The impact of the number of books at home is also
much larger for non-repeaters. In Table 5, we also compare the SRM estimation
with these three models and nd similar results. However, we nd some important
di¤erential e¤ects for variables such as immigrant status, parentseducational status
or class size. For example, the optimal class size in both OLS models is about 24
students, for both repeaters and non-repeaters, whereas the SRM, as emphasized
above, predicts smaller optimal class size for repeaters than for non-repeaters.
The di¤erent results found using these models are not surprising. The SRM
implies estimating two correlation coe¢ cients between the unobservable factors that
a¤ect each of the two educational outcomes and unobserved variables that a¤ect the
probability of repeating a grade. Specically, we get a positive estimate of R (0.31)
and a negative (and signicant) value for NR (-0.22), as can be seen at the button
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of Table 5.20 The intuition behind NR < 0 could be that potential non-repeaters
may have unobservable characteristics that make them perform better than potential
repeaters when they are promoted. A consequence of this will be that the negative
grade retention e¤ect is bigger for non-repeaters than for repeaters. Thus, this result
is capturing the impact of studentsunobserved ability. Although not signicant in
this specication, we consider it useful to interpret the result of R > 0; which has
emerged as signicant in some of the models explained in footnote 20 above. This
sign may mean that repeaters have unobservable characteristics that make them also
perform better in case they must repeat a grade. As a result, the negative e¤ect of
grade retention will be lower for a repeater than for a non-repeater. The intuition
behind this result can be found in parental interest and studentse¤ort. Namely,
those students who must repeat recruit greater support from their parents, improving
educational attainment.
To estimate the grade retention e¤ect, we use several models. Table 6 shows the
results. First, OLS(b) estimates a unique and linear grade retention e¤ect on PISA
scores (coe¢ cient  in equation (1)) without allowing for endogenous selection into
repeater and non-repeater groups. The estimated e¤ect of repeating is equal to -80.4
points (see column 4 in Table 6). If we control for the endogeneity of repeating in
the outcome equation but assume a unique education process for repeaters and non-
repeaters (IV), we nd that repetition diminishes PISA scores by 73.4 points (see
column 5 in Table 6). Next, we relax the hypothesis of one educational equation and
instead assume that repeaters and non-repeaters have a di¤erent education produc-
tion process (OLS(a)), nding that the grade retention e¤ect for repeaters (-78.9) is
slightly lower than that for non-repeaters (-85.7).
Finally, we comment on the SRM results, which di¤er greatly from those described
above. A huge negative impact of grade retention on scores is estimated for both
repeaters and non- repeaters. Nonetheless, the retention e¤ect for the latter (-125.1)
is more than double the repetition impact for the former (-56.2). This result is a
direct consequence of the correlation between the unobservable factors in the selection
20The results regarding NR and R are robust to other sets of instrumental variables. For
example, we explore the validity of adding two instruments to the quarter of birth instrument:
whether the students mother and/or father does not live at home and frequency of playing computer
games. We claim here that a students father or mother may not live at home because of a previous
parental death or divorce, which, according to the existing literature, does not negatively a¤ect
teenagerscognitive skills (see Sanz de Galdeano and Vuri (2007)), such as the skills measured in
PISA scores. However, parental death or divorce may a¤ect a students probability of repeating a
grade by the time it occurs. Finally, we consider computer games as another instrument, as this
instrument is not signicant in explaining the PISA test scores (see Table 5), but it has a huge
impact on the propensity of repeating a grade (see Table 1 and Table 4).
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and the outcome equations. To conrm this connection, suppose that two students,
one with the average characteristics of a repeater and another one with the average
characteristics of a non-repeater, do not repeat a grade. Then, the negative sign
of NR implies that the average non-repeater has better unobservable factors (e.g.,
ability), which allows her to perform better than the average repeater. Now suppose
that these two students have been retained; then the positive sign of R implies that
the student with the repeater characteristics has unobservable factors (e.g., parental
e¤ort or support) that lead her to achieve better results than the student with non-
repeater characteristics. Thus, both NR < 0 and R > 0 imply that a repeater
student loses little as a result of being retained in comparison with a non-repeater.
Columns 6-8 of Table 6 show that retention e¤ect estimates depend on the type
of repetition to which a student has been subjected. The e¤ect is highly negative
regardless of whether repetition occurs at the primary or secondary level. However,
two interesting features arise. First, we estimate the impact of repeating at both
educational levels, primary and secondary, to be much larger than the e¤ect of re-
peating only once, at either the primary or secondary level. These di¤erences account
for more than 37 and 27 points for repeaters and non-repeaters, respectively. As we
nd that repeating one grade has a negative impact on scores, this result is not
surprising. Second, our results show that the e¤ect of repeating at the secondary
level is slightly di¤erent than that of repeating at the primary level. In particular,
secondary repeaters lose 10 fewer points than primary repeaters because of the repeti-
tion. Nonetheless, if a non-repeater were subjected to grade retention, the impact on
his or her score would be 9 points larger if the retention happened during secondary
school.
Table 7 shows the grade retention e¤ect for students in every region in our sam-
ple. Similarly to the pooled sample, in every region the e¤ect of grade retention on
scores is highly negative and larger for non-repeaters than for repeaters. However, we
note some interesting di¤erences across regions: the Balearic Islands, with a grade
retention e¤ect of -39 and -109 points for repeaters and non-repeaters, respectively,
shows a much di¤erent result with respect to the best performing regions, such as La
Rioja, whose corresponding gures are -67 and -139, and the pooled gures for all of
Spain (-56 and -125 points for repeaters and non-repeaters, respectively; that is, 10%
and 24% of the non-repeating outcome in each case).
Finally, we estimate the three di¤erent components in Equation (12) to decom-
pose the estimated di¤erences between repeaters and non-repeaters. Table 7 reports
the percentage of observed di¤erences between repeaters and non-repeaters due to
each of these three components. This exercise is done for the whole sample and for
each separate region. The results are shown in the bottom panel of Table 7. If we
20
analyze this decomposition for the national sample, we can see that the majority of
the di¤erences, 89%, is due to di¤erences in the coe¢ cients, that is, in the predicted
e¤ect of the observable characteristics for each student group. Hence, repeaters ob-
tain a worse score than non-repeaters because the impact of the observable variables
on their outcomes is stronger for non-repeaters. With respect to di¤erences in observ-
able characteristics, we nd that they account for about one-fourth of the observed
di¤erences. What is more interesting in the context of our analysis is the negative
sign of the endogenous selection component (-15%). This nding means that, in
case of not allowing for endogenous selection, existing di¤erences between repeaters
and non-repeaters would be overestimated. As shown in Table 7, this pattern is the
same in every region, although Catalonia and the Basque Country are the two re-
gions whose coe¢ cients of observable characteristics explain the most, almost 100%
of the di¤erences, and also the ones with the highest gures for endogenous selection
(-26% and -24%, respectively). This nding is interesting given that precisely these
two regions have the lowest grade retention rates among Spanish regions. We can
conclude from this analysis that their low retention rates are not reducing the grade
of self-selection into the repeater and non-repeater student groups. On the contrary,
those regions with fewer repeaters seem to have more selection into both groups of
students, indicating that it is even more important to control for such selection issues
to properly measure the retention e¤ect in these two regions and to compare them
with other regions in Spain.
To conclude, we propose the following question: how could the mean score for
the whole sample change if there were no grade retention policy at all in Spain? We
construct a counterfactual based on SRM estimations to handle this issue. The actual
average math score yA is computed as the weighted average of actual repeatersand
non-repeatersscores, that is:
yA = E (yR j I = 1)  PR + E (yNR j I = 0)  PNR; (17)
where PR and PNR denote the percentages of repeaters and non-repeaters in the
sample. Assume now that there is no grade retention policy in place. Then, we can
compute a counterfactual for the average math score, the predicted average math
score yP , where we introduce the expected score for repeaters had they not repeated,
that is:
yP = E (yNR j I = 1)  PR + (yNR j I = 0)  PNR: (18)
The results for Spain are yA = 491:5 and yP = 515:2. That is, by eliminating the
grade retention policy, the PISA score would be almost 25 points higher. Note that we
are implicitly assuming that, in the no-grade-retention scenario, studentsbehavior
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does not change (for both repeaters and non-repeaters); that is, they exert the same
e¤ort, and thus, their score does not diminish. However, we have no clear evidence
about the e¤ect of the grade retention policy on student e¤ort. Indeed, it is di¢ cult to
believe that this e¤ect could exceed the positive e¤ect of removing the grade retention
policy estimated in this study. Nonetheless, this is a strong assumption, and thus,
we try to relax it.
Suppose that we could measure studentse¤ort using studentsduration of self-
study at home.21 Then, we could try to determine the impact of this variable on
educational outcomes and check whether a change in the duration of self-study would
be enough to counteract the benets we estimate. We are able to do this because
students were asked about their self-study time in PISA 2006 (unfortunately this
variable is not present in PISA 2009). In Figure 4, we can see that scores increase
only slightly with weekly hours of self-study. In fact, there is a certain point of
self-study frequency above in which the educational outcomes do not vary or even
worsen.22 If we assume this to be the e¤ect of e¤ort, it is di¢ cult to believe that a
change in student behavior could balance the benets of removing the grade retention
policy. Hence, we support the idea that if the grade retention policy were eliminated,
the Spanish average score would increase, as measured above, for 15-year-old students.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our results show that grade retention has a substantial negative impact on edu-
cational outcomes as measured by the PISA program. In addition, we nd that
this negative e¤ect is bigger for non-repeaters than for repeaters (-24% vs. -10% of
the non-repeater average score). That is, had they been retained as repeaters, non-
repeatersPISA outcomes would have been reduced more than by twice the reduction
observed for repeaters. In other words, grade retention improves the quality of the
match between the school and the student.
Moreover, di¤erent types of grade repetition do not change much as the impact
is highly negative for both repeaters and non-repeaters, whether it occurs during
21Observe that there are two implicit assumptions in this exercise that are worthy of mention:
rst, the underlying criteria to analyze the optimal grade retention policy is utilitarianism, and
second, studentsutility is linear in e¤ort.
22We think that the inverted-U shape in this graph could demonstrate that students who study
frequently are those with more learning di¢ culties. As studentse¤ort, measured by self-study time,
may be endogenous to educational achievement, the impact of this factor should be estimated by
the appropriate technique (i.e., Instrumental Variables). However, we will not discuss the impact of
studentse¤ort on achievement here as it is not the focus of the paper.
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Figure 4: Math scores in PISA 2006 by hours of self study in math
primary or secondary education. Our results show that if a student was retained
at the primary level, she will su¤er a causal decrease in her performance, but this
situation could be even worse if this student was subjected to a second grade retention
in secondary school.
Finally, we decompose the observed di¤erence among Spanish repeatersand non-
repeatersscores. We nd that the observed di¤erences among these two groups are
essentially explained by the di¤erent returns to the observed individual, familiar and
school characteristics that explain educational outcomes. This component accounts
for about 89% of the total di¤erence whereas the component due to di¤erences in such
observed characteristics is only 25%. What is more interesting is that endogenous
selection makes observed di¤erences appear 15% lower than they actually are. Thus,
if such endogeneity in the retaining status was not considered, di¤erences between
repeaters and non-repeaters would be overestimated. Interestingly, this bias is most
important in Catalonia and the Basque Country, the two regions where grade reten-
tion is the lowest among all Spanish regions. Hence, these regionsslightly di¤erent
retention policy does not seem to decrease the di¤erences between repeaters and non-
repeaters. On the contrary, the smaller observed di¤erences in these two regions are
due largely to increased self-selection into both student groups.
Several extensions of this work are possible. An important future study could
perform a cost-benet analysis regarding the grade retention policy. The cost of
grade retention includes any additional years of schooling provided to students who
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are held back.23 Another interesting extension could be to study the long-run e¤ects
of a grade retention policy, for example, by considering its impact on drop-out rates,
college attendance and job-market results.
Finally, we believe our results to be of special interest in the actual debate on eco-
nomics of education and educational policies. First, note that the regional di¤erences
we observe may be due to di¤erences in the management of the public educational
services at the regional level, as we control for individual and socioeconomic variables.
Thus, the worst-performing regions can learn from the best performers regarding the
management of retention policies. Second, and more importantly, in a context of
increasing interest in academic performance di¤erences across countries (as the im-
portance of human capital accumulation to growth becomes well known), it is impor-
tant to evaluate the educational policies in place. This is particularly true for those
policies that are supposed to serve as a remedial for poor academic performance, as
is the case for the grade retention policy.
23For example, the average cost of schooling in Spain in 2007, in terms of government and family
expenditures, was, at current prices, 4,870e and 6,508e per student at the primary and secondary
level, respectively. These gures amount to a yearly cost of schooling of 811e (for six years) and
1627e (for four years), respectively (see Instituto de Evaluación, 2010).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Grade retention and PISA 2009 Math
scores
Variable N Non-repeaters Repeaters
% score % score
REGIONS
Andalusia 1,416 57.1 503.7 42.9 405.8
Aragon 1,514 60.5 548.7 39.5 439.6
Asturias 1,536 68.9 529.4 31.1 414.2
Balearic Islands 1,463 59.6 503.4 40.4 407.2
Canary Islands 1,448 54.5 474.4 45.5 387.6
Cantabria 1,516 63.8 533.7 36.2 425.7
Castile Leon 1,515 64.5 551.6 35.5 446.7
Catalonia 1,381 76.7 517.3 23.3 424
Galicia 1,585 62.5 526.2 37.5 427.4
La Rioja 1,288 60.9 551.3 39.1 429.2
Madrid 1,453 61.7 537.8 38.3 429.8
Murcia 1,321 63 513.4 37.0 417.5
Navarre 1,504 71.8 542.7 28.2 431
Basque Country 4,768 77.6 533.5 22.4 427.1
Ceuta y Melilla 1,370 52.6 471.2 47.4 356.5
Rest of Spain 809 60.7 521.7 39.3 423.5
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Male 13,141 58.9 535.2 41.1 431.8
Female 12,746 68.1 507.7 31.9 401.8
Born in 1st quarter 6,284 69.5 520.9 30.5 421.5
Born in 2nd quarter 6,558 66.2 521.9 33.8 417
Born in 3th quarter 6,705 61.9 518 38.1 419.2
Born in 4th quarter 6,340 56.7 522.3 43.3 418.5
Native 23,188 66.9 523.5 33.1 423.9
Immigrant 2,227 33.5 483.8 66.5 400
< every week PC use for homework 21,013 60.0 520.3 40.0 421.6
Every week PC use for homework 4,284 71.3 523.1 28.7 418.5
< almost every day play PC games 21,013 66.1 519.4 33.9 420.1
Almost every day play PC games 4,284 54.3 533.5 45.7 421.3
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Table 1 (cont.): Descriptive statistics. Grade retention and PISA Math
scores
Variable N Non-repeaters Repeaters
% Score % Score
SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES
Mother low education 8,796 53.3 505.8 46.7 413.1
Mother High education 16,180 71.6 529 28.4 428.1
Father low education 8,987 55.0 506 45.0 416.2
Father high education 15,369 71.5 530.3 28.5 426.6
0-25 books at home 5,331 38.8 471.1 61.2 390.2
26-200 books at home 13,153 66.3 518.5 33.7 434.3
>200 books at home 7,074 80.8 546.3 19.2 451.1
Mother lives at home 24,853 64.6 521.4 35.4 420.8
Mother does not live at home 567 35.0 495 65.0 401.4
Father lives at home 22,224 65.8 521.7 34.2 421.3
Father does not live at home 2,544 51.5 517.5 48.5 416.1
SCHOOL VARIABLES
Less than 50% girls 12,405 67.3 522.8 32.7 417.7
More than 50% girls 12,349 59.7 518.5 40.3 420.6
Private independent school 885 80.5 535.8 19.5 434.4
Private govern-depend.school 8,154 74.4 525.1 25.6 430.1
Public 15,336 56.4 516.1 43.6 416.2
<=21 students per class 12,778 54.4 515.2 45.6 414.6
> 21 students per class 12,314 72.1 525.1 27.9 428.5
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics. Regional distribution of explanatory
variables (%)
Variables And Ara Ast Bal Cana Cant Cast Cat
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Females 47.4 49.4 47.4 50 47.6 49.1 51 48.7
Born in 2nd quarter 23.5 23.9 27.1 23.5 22 25.1 26.1 24.4
Born in 3th quarter 25.9 27.7 26.4 25.6 27.1 25.3 25.4 26.4
Born in 4th quarter 27.1 23.9 22.6 26 26.3 26.6 24.4 25.2
Inmigrants 5.8 12.2 5.2 15.3 11.7 7.1 5.3 11.2
Ev. week PC for homework 37.9 37.3 37.1 48.1 44.7 40.5 33.9 60.2
Al. every day play PC 19.6 17.9 22.2 20 15.9 15 16.1 18.8
SOCIO-ECO. VARIABLES
Mother High education 46.8 65.8 69 58.5 53.7 68.7 66.6 62.9
Father High education 44.7 64.7 65.7 57.8 49.8 64 62.5 61.6
26-200 books at home 51.7 51.6 51.9 51.5 45.2 52.3 53.1 50.9
>200 books at home 17.9 31.3 30.3 26.2 13.8 27.2 35.3 29.4
Mother does not live at home 2.2 2.3 3 2.4 4 2.4 2.2 1.2
Father does not live at home 10.4 9.2 12.9 12.9 15.2 11.6 7.1 10.3
SCHOOL VARIABLES
More than 50% girls 47 57.7 56.2 34.6 61.4 39.9 55.2 54.4
Private independent school 1.4 4 2.1 4.5 0 3.5 9.2 15.1
Private govern-depend. sch. 24.1 26.4 30.6 29.8 18.2 35.3 23.7 24.1
> 21 students per class 60.3 47.6 30.2 48.1 54.2 35.3 48 63.1
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Table 2 (cont.): Descriptive statistics. Regional distribution of
explanatory variables (%)
Variables Gal Rio Mad Mur Nav Basq C y M Rest All
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Females 49.7 48.9 50 50.2 47.6 48.5 50.8 50.8 49.2
Born in 2nd quarter 25 27.7 26.8 25.5 25.8 26.5 23.1 25.1 24.9
Born in 3th quarter 24.9 26.8 25.7 26.7 26.1 24.2 26.6 28 26.3
Born in 4th quarter 26.5 23.7 23.9 22.4 23.1 23.3 26.9 24.7 25.2
Immigrants 4.2 13.1 16.3 12.5 12.7 4.7 10.7 9.2 9.5
Ev. week PC for homework 26.6 41.8 37.4 35.9 44.4 45.3 47.2 36.9 40.9
Al. every day play PC 16.8 16.3 16.7 17.6 15 14.1 20.8 17.4 17.8
SOCIO-ECO. VARIABLES
Mother High education 59.5 64.8 69.1 52 71.8 77.5 47.8 59.1 59.7
Father High education 57.8 60.7 64.9 55.4 68.8 77 54.4 56.1 57.3
26-200 books at home 54 52.6 50.7 51.4 51 52.6 42.3 54.2 51.8
>200 books at home 26.5 28.4 30.3 20.3 29 33.4 15 25.1 25.5
Mother does not live at home 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.8 2 2 4.3 1.4 2
Father does not live at home 11.7 8.9 11.8 8.7 7.9 9.8 10.8 8.4 10.3
SCHOOL VARIABLES
More than 50% girls 53.6 55.1 46.9 54.8 55 41.9 49.3 66 53.4
Private independent school 6.3 0 7.3 2.4 2.6 0 2.9 4.3 5.2
Private govern-depend. sch. 25.5 32.7 32.1 22.7 34.7 57.7 17.6 17.5 25.7
> 21 students per class 44 58.6 62.5 66.1 56.7 33.7 65 52.3 55.4
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Table 3: Distribution of Math scores
Number of
observations
Mean P25 P50 P75
Non-repeaters 17,678 520.71 475.94 522.29 568.86
Repeaters 8,209 418.93 369.15 420.17 470.95
Repeaters_P 1,071 422.72 371.95 414.64 483.26
Repeaters_PS 1,406 371.45 326.93 373.90 419.70
Repeaters_S 5,374 442.25 398.04 445.79 487.31
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Table 4: Selection equation estimation
SRM PROBIT
REGIONS
Andalusia 0:02
(0:06)
0:01
(0:06)
Aragon 0:08
(0:06)
0:07
(0:06)
Asturias  0:38
(0:06)
 0:33
(0:06)
Balearic islands 0:03
(0:07)
 0:01
(0:08)
Cantabria  0:11
(0:07)
 0:03
(0:07)
Castile Leon 0:01
(0:07)
0:08
(0:07)
Catalonia  0:4
(0:09)
 0:44
(0:09)
Galicia  0:11
(0:06)
 0:03
(0:06)
La Rioja 0:02
(0:061)
 0:0
(0:06)
5
Madrid 0:03
(0:06)
0:04
(0:06)
Murcia  0:12
(0:06)
 0:13
(0:05)
Navarre  0:32
(0:06)
 0:32
(0:06)
Basque Country  0:44
(0:06)
 0:4
(0:06)
Ceuta y Melilla 0:06
(0:06)
0:12
(0:06)
Rest of Spain 0:01
(0:07)
0:04
(0:07)
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Gender (female)  0:26
(0:03)
 0:23
(0:03)
Born in 3th quarter 0:1
(0:04)
0:13
(0:04)
Born in 4th quarter 0:28
(0:04)
0:19
(0:04)
Immigrant 0:59
(0:06)
0:6
(0:06)
Every week use PC for homework  0:33
(0:04)
 0:25
(0:04)
Almost every day playing PC games 0:21
(0:05)
0:22
(0:05)
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Table 4 (cont.): Selection equation estimation
SRM PROBIT
SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES
Mother high and father low education  0:22
(0:05)
 0:26
(0:05)
Mother low and father high education  0:16
(0:05)
 0:17
(0:05)
Mother and father high education  0:38
(0:05)
 0:38
(0:05)
26-200 books at home  0:46
(0:05)
 0:48
( 0:05)
>200 books at home  0:74
(0:07)
 0:8
( 0:07)
Mother is not at home 0:48
(0:12)
0:39
(0:12)
Father is not at home 0:23
(0:07)
0:24
(0:07)
SCHOOL VARIABLES
Majority of girls in school 0:1
(0:04)
0:08
(0:047)
Private gov-dependent school  0:23
(0:04)
 0:16
(0:04)
Private independent school  0:18
(0:077)
 0:25
(0:08)
Class size  0:13
(0:02)
 0:13
(0:02)
Class size ^2 0:002
(0:0006)
0:002
(0:0007)
Constant 1:99
(0:23)
1:98
(0:24)
Loglikehood (or pseudo)  1; 944; 306:3  10; 628:9
Note 1:

,

and

means that coe¢ cient is signicant at 10%, 5% or 1%, respectively.
Note 2: Number of observations is 21,360. Standard errors in brackets
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Table 5: E¤ect of individual, socio-economic and school variables on Math score
Non-repeaters Repeaters All All
SRM OLS (a) SRM OLS (a) OLS (b) IV
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Gender (female)  27:73
(2:14)
 29:43
(2:053)
 34:64
(4:86)
 31:03
(3:283)
 30:02
(1:82)
 29:48
(2:71)
Immigrant  26:8
(5:79)
 21:75
(5:51)
 4:68
(8:65)
 12:19
(4:358)
 16:66
(3:302)
 17:97
(6:77)
Every week use PC for homework 4:4
(2:29)
2:27
(1:971)
 5:01
(5:54)
 0:67
(3:215)
1:15
(1:612)
1:87
(3:26)
Almost every day playing PC games 3:64
(3:55)
5:18
(3:213)
 2:4
(5:79)
 5:64
(4:893)
0:32
(2:828)
 0:26
(3:42)
SOCIO-ECO VARIABLES
Mother high father low educ. 3:81
(4:11)
2:16
(3:935)
10:77
(4:43)
13:56
(4:2)
6:03
(3:21)
6:49
(3:71)
Mother low father high educ. 4:68
(4:26)
3:46
(4:254)
3:26
(7:63)
5:82
(6:559)
3:98
(3:825)
4:42
(4:33)
Mother and father high educ. 17:15
(3:47)
14:58
(3:103)
1:37
(7:51)
6:65
(4:415)
12:42
(2:854)
13:27
(4:40)
26-200 books at home 38:85
(3:52)
34:86
(3:236)
27:34
(7:10)
33:46
(3:803)
33:44
(2:648)
34:51
(5:26)
>200 books at home 63:43
(4:34)
57:93
(3:565)
35:59
(11:83)
46:28
(6:297)
54:75
(3:438)
56:38
(7:38)
Mother is not at home  21:28
(9:27)
 17:66
(8:863)
4:56
(13:24)
 0:57
(11:244)
 6:5
(7:612)
 7:56
(9:27)
Father is not at home 0
(4:09)
1:77
(4:107)
6:39
(5:38)
3:55
(4:429)
3:09
(3:352)
2:43
(3:62)
SCHOOL VARIABLES
Majority of girls in school 0
(3:98)
0:6
(3:884)
5:73
(4:71)
4:51
(4:592)
1:88
(3:425)
1:69
(3:57)
Private gov-dependent school  0:2
(3:9)
 1:61
(3:923)
3:4
(6:05)
6:94
(4:986)
1:08
(3:787)
1:47
(4:19)
Private independent school 2:04
(8:49)
0:91
(8:518)
1:84
(11:23)
4:76
(11:057)
2:59
(8:373)
2:87
(8:58)
Class size 7:38
(1:51)
6:32
(1:56)
2:58
(2:10)
3:93
(1:192)
4:82
(0:91)
5:14
(1:43)
Class size ^2  0:15
(0:04)
 0:13
(0:037)
 0:06
(0:05)
 0:08
(0:033)
 0:1
(0:024)
 0:10
(0:03)
Constant 354:57
(18:81)
383:01
(17:639)
347:43
(15:77)
341:03
(12:034)
405:17
(9:852)
396:69
(33:00)
Retained  80:4
(2:03)
 73:41
(26:97)
Correlation coe¢ cients  0:22
(0:11)
0:31
(0:3)
R2 0:21 0:17 0:41 0:46
Note 1:

,

and

means that coe¢ cient is signicant at 10%, 5% or 1%, respectively.
Note 2: Number of total observations is 21,360, and 14,969 and 6,391 of NR and R respectively. Standard errors in brackets
Note 3: Log pseudolikelihood (SRM) = -1,944,306.3;
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Table 6: Grade retention e¤ect on Math scores
Main model: REP Repeaters Type
REP_S REP_P REP_PS
Predictions SRM OLS (a) OLS (b) IV SRM SRM SRM
y1R 423.9 424.5 - - 442.7 425.1 377.1
y1NR 480.2 503.4 - - 489.8 482.9 471.8
GRE1 = y1R   y1NR -56.2 -78.9 -80.4 -73.4 -47.1 -57.7 -94.7
y0R 397.2 442.5 - - 417.6 426.9 391.1
y0NR 522.4 528.2 - - 528.2 528.2 528.6
GRE0 = y0R   y0NR -125.1 -85.7 -80.4 -73.4 -110.5 -101.2 -137.4
Note 1: The e¤ects of the four types of repetition is based on di¤erent estimations where I=0 if student is
Non-Repeater and I=1 if student is repeater of each the four types: Rep, Rep_S, Rep_P and Rep_PS, respectively.
Note 2: The number of observations are 14,969, 6,391, 3,718, 693 and 1,036 for Non-Repeaters, Repeaters,
Repeaters_S, Repeaters_P and Repeaters_PS respectively.
Note 3: The equations yRi and yNRi are the same when estimating by OLS or IV.
Note 4: The estimated SRM correlation coe¢ cient NR for Rep_S and Rep_P estimations is not signicant,
however for Rep_PS is negative (-0.26) and signicant (t-student=  1:94) as in the main model estimation (-0.22,
signicant at 5%). On the contrary, estimated coe¢ cient R is not signicant in any of the models.
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Table 7: Grade retention e¤ect. Decomposition of di¤erences between R and NR. By region.
Spain And Ara Ast Bal Cana Cant Cast Cat
SRM
GRE1 = y1R   y1NR -56.2 -56.7 -61.0 -58.2 -38.5 -46.8 -60.9 -66.9 -48.1
GRE0 = y0R   y0NR -125.1 -123.2 -129.9 -131.9 -108.8 -110.9 -130.8 -135.6 -121.3
y0NR   y1R (%)
Characteristics 25.3 21.2 24.9 29.6 34.0 19.1 26.2 19.6 25.1
Coe¢ cients 89.3 91.5 87.4 86.9 80.1 94.0 88.0 95.6 101.4
Endogenous selec. -14.6 -12.6 -12.3 -16.6 -14.1 -13.2 -14.2 -15.1 -26.4
Table 7 (cont.): Grade retention e¤ect. Deco. of di¤erences between R and NR. By region.
Gal Rio Mad Mur Nav Basq C y M Rest
SRM
GRE1 = y1R   y1NR -58.3 -67.3 -59.2 -52.7 -55.3 -57.6 -57.4 -56.6
GRE0 = y0R   y0NR -125.6 -138.6 -129.9 -120.7 -130.1 -132.2 -126.9 -124.3
y0NR   y1R (%)
Characteristics 19.4 27.3 27.9 21.6 32.5 24.1 29.0 23.4
Coe¢ cients 97.1 84.2 84.7 95.0 85.7 99.6 80.4 89.1
Endogenous selec. -16.5 -11.5 -12.6 -16.6 -18.3 -23.7 -9.5 -12.5
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